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The Weakness of European Wales 
Richard Morden and Penni bestic 
 
One of the shocks of the Brexit referendum was that, while Scotland voted 
emphatically to stay in the EU, Wales voted out. This demolished the received 
wisdom aligning Euro-scepticism with the political Right, since Wales as a whole has 
tended to lean Left since the early twentieth century. The result also surprised 
commentators because Wales has been the beneficiary of so much EU funding. To 
some it looked like the turkeys had voted for Christmas.  
 
That, of course, is a gross over-simplification of an outcome which resulted from a 
complex set of inter-related factors. Various suggestions have been put forward to 
explain the Leave vote as a whole, including wealth inequality, an educational divide, 
young vs. old, the influence of the right-wing print media, and a trans-national revolt 
against established elites. These would all have had a major influence on the result 
in both Wales and Scotland. However they don’t tell us why these two nations, which 
claim a dubious Celtic kinship and which occupy similarly devolved positions within 
the United Kingdom, voted differently.  
 
However that question can be addressed by examining how the Welsh and the Scots 
understand the histories of their respective nations. This is a potentially revealing 
angle because ideas about the past provide the foundation for national identities in 
the present. The glories and triumphs of yesteryear, the collective endurance of 
vicissitudes long past, the belief in shared origins and collective experiences: these 
are the things which provide the raw materials from which notions of ‘we, the people’ 
are built. That point is significant for this article because during the referendum 
campaign Brexiteers tended to couch the referendum as a choice between two 
Unions, the British and the European. In this context, how Welsh and Scots voters 
view the British state and the historical landscape it occupies become important.  
 
Superficially at least, there are a lot of similarities between popular portrayals of the 
national past in Wales and Scotland. In both countries the rise of nationalism has 
been fuelled by the decline or removal of forces which traditionally helped to hold the 
United Kingdom together; i.e. Empire, Protestantism and threats from mainland 
Europe. In both cases the result has been the growth of a historical narrative in 
which struggle against unjust English dominance has become the prevailing theme. 
Stories of resistance against English power, particularly during the Middle Ages, 
have thus garnered considerable cultural traction. Hence in 1997 the prospect of 
regaining self-government after centuries of rule from Westminster helped to secure 
Yes votes in both the Welsh and Scottish devolution referendums.  
 
Tellingly, however, while almost three-quarters of participating Scots voted in favour 
of a Scottish parliament and 65 per cent supported giving it tax-varying powers, 
barely 50 per cent of Welsh voters supported the watered-down devolution offered to 
Wales in 1997. Moreover in 2016 the SNP secured almost 50 per cent of the 
available seats in the Scottish parliament, while in the same year Plaid Cymru won 
only 20 per cent of those in the Welsh Assembly. Already we begin to see a broad 
correlation between different levels of enthusiasm for political nationalism on the one 
hand, and the different outcomes of the Brexit on the other.  
 
In Scotland the SNP have in recent years positioned their brand of nationalism as 
avowedly civic, eschewing the ethno-centricism of the party’s formative years. Now 
they argue that to be Scottish you simply need to live in Scotland and buy into the 
principles of fairness and progressivism with which the mainstream nationalist 
movement has associated itself. In this vision of Scottishness, membership comes 
through territory and values rather than blood and shared history. Nonetheless, ideas 
about the past play an important role in underpinning even this liberal form of 
national sentiment. If we strip away the touristic trappings of tartanry and bagpipes, 
Scots tend to think of themselves not as Celts but as a mongrel people. Their shared 
identity was purportedly forged on the anvil of medieval English imperialism, which 
hammered the Scottish people into existence out of a motley collection of Picts, 
Gaels, Vikings, Saxons and of course the Scots themselves (hailing confusingly from 
Ireland). Scottish identity thus has no clear ethnic core. Not does it have any strong 
linguistic element. Gaelic is the preserve of a small minority of the population, while 
for many the Scots language is seen as a dialect rather than a national tongue. All of 
this makes a version of nationalism based on participation rather than ancestry that 
much easier to sustain, simply because there are relatively few criteria available 
which might serve to exclude.  
 
Moreover despite its protestations of modernity, political nationalism in Scotland 
actually relies quite heavily on a cultural inheritance from the past. The Holyrood 
government has already been accused by some teachers, historians and media 
commentators [1] of using the school history curriculum to deliver a radical 
nationalist agenda, while research by sociologists Richard Kiely, Frank Bechhofer 
and David McCrone [2] has shown that for most Scots birth and blood trump territory 
as markers of belonging. Yet crucially, popular understandings of the national past 
are also replete with European connections. These include the Auld Alliance with 
France, the influence of Roman law on Scottish jurisprudence, the traditionally 
continental character of Scottish education, and Scotland’s contribution to the 
European Enlightenment. In this way the nation is positioned within the history of 
European rather than British civilisation. Indeed, the ongoing popularity of William 
Wallace as a totem of national liberty, immortalised in the 1992 blockbuster 
Braveheart, is just one example of how resistant retellings of the Scottish past have 
become to notions of a shared British history  
 
So here we have a version of national identity that characterises Scotland as a 
European nation and offers few excuses to prohibit membership on the grounds of 
ethnicity or language. Of course it is difficult to establish a concrete correlation 
between that and the fact that 62 per cent of Scots recently voted to remain in the 
EU. Nonetheless it does seem reasonable to posit a connection, especially given the 
different outcome in Wales.  
 
Mainstream Welsh nationalism, articulated primarily by Plaid Cymru, now also 
positions itself as civic rather than ethnic. Yet unlike the Scots, the Welsh can lay 
claim to an ethnic identity which, while mythic, is racially coherent. This is based on 
their supposed descent from the Celts who occupied Britain before the arrival of the 
Anglo-Saxons during the early Middle Ages. In Wales, therefore, the materials for 
constructing an identity based on blood and ancestry are more abundant than in 
Scotland. Nor is there any comparable tradition in Wales of cultural exchange with 
the continent, or of placing Welsh history within a European context. That is not say 
that such interactions did not take place or that scholars have failed to examine 
Wales within a wider European setting. The point is rather that popular imaginings of 
the Welsh past nowadays still tend to be dominated by the relationship with, and 
struggle against, England.  
 
There is certainly a lot of cultural potential in Welsh complaints of ill-treatment by the 
English. Wales’s last independent prince was conquered and killed in 1282. Then in 
the early sixteenth century the principality, already under English control, was 
formally annexed. The cultural nationalists of the nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries saw both conquest and union in broadly positive terms. Yet over the last 
hundred years these events have become associated with foreign oppression and 
the suppression of national freedom. This stands in marked contrast to the story 
which the Scots can tell, of repeatedly fighting off the English during the Middle Ages 
before entering willingly into a union of equals in 1707. Clearly, however, that sense 
of historical injustice has not led to a Welsh separatist movement on the scale of that 
found in Scotland. Owain Glyndŵr is certainly a national icon but not on the scale of 
Wallace. Pilgrims don’t flock to the location of his 1404 Welsh parliament in 
Machynlleth in the way they do to the site of Wallace’s 1297 victory over the English 
at Stirling Bridge.  
 
Despite the polemical potential of Welsh history, there seems to be little appetite in 
present-day Wales for independence. The state of the Welsh language may be in 
part responsible for that. On one level its resilience acts as an ever-present reminder 
of the historical distinctiveness and Celtic origins of the Welsh people. Crucially, 
however, it is not successful enough to offer a unifying principle of Welshness. The 
former industrial heartlands of south-east and north-east Wales remain 
predominantly English speaking. This is partly a legacy of the hundreds of thousands 
of English immigrants who settled in those areas between 1851 and 1911 [3].  
Moreover, those same regions were in the early twentieth century at the forefront of 
the labour movement in Wales, whose rhetoric tended to paint national boundaries 
as a bourgeois irrelevance in the struggle for working class identity. In that context 
Welsh was a hindrance rather than a help to calls for the workers of the world to 
unite. So while the language now occupies an official status equal to that of English 
and is a compulsory subject in schools, today only nineteen per cent of those living 
in Wales speak it, according to the 2011 census. That is certainly far more than 
speak Gaelic in Scotland, but it is still only a minority of the population. The result is 
that Welsh does indeed impact upon notions of identity to a far greater extent than 
Gaelic, but often divides rather than unites those who speak it and those who do not.  
 
So what does all this tell us about the Brexit vote? Well, if we remove the young and 
cosmopolitan population of Cardiff from the mix then we find that the two counties 
with the most Welsh speakers, Gwynedd and Ceredigion, also saw the highest 
percentage of votes to remain in the EU. These areas were again near the top of the 
table for Yes votes in the devolution referendum of 1997 [4] and have voted for Plaid 
Cymru AMs in every Assembly election since [5]. This point is relevant because one 
of the key arguments of the Leave campaign related to British sovereignty. The 
devolution referenda and electoral results we have already looked at suggest that 
unionism is a more potent force in Wales than in Scotland. Yet those from Welsh-
speaking areas seem less attached to the British state and, in the terms set out by 
Brexiteers, therefore more willing to vote against it.  
 
By couching the Brexit vote as a choice between the United Kingdom and a 
European super-state, Leave campaigners sought to mobilise British national 
sentiment. Their victory suggests that this was a successful strategy, but an 
unintended consequence was that Welshness and Scottishness were also brought 
into play. For Scots the inevitability of union with England has in recent decades 
been called into question – the small margin in the 2015 independence referendum 
is clear evidence of that. This in turn has enabled a flourishing vision of Scotland as 
a historically European nation with a welcoming and inclusive national character. The 
accuracy of that rosy depiction is irrelevant. What matters is its grip on the national 
psyche and, by extension, its role in clearing the way for more Scots to vote Remain 
than Leave.  
 
In Wales the choice between these unions, British and European, interacted with 
identity politics rather differently. Here the historical materials which shore up the 
national self-image have produced a version of nationalism which, despite the efforts 
of Plaid Cymru, remains more ethnically insular, less overtly European, and is 
fractured rather than united by language. This may be one reason why, when forced 
by political rhetoric into a choice between the British state and the European 
community, 52.5 per cent of Welsh voters chose the former. One factor of many 
certainly, but a factor nonetheless.  
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